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Introduction 
In orthodox neoclassical theory, regional differences in levels of per capita 
income and unemployment are narrowed by the processes of factor mobility and 
trade. Conventional neoclassical growth theory also predicts the long run 
convergence of per capita incomes across regions and countries, with all 
economies converging on a common long run steady-state growth of labour 
augmenting technical progress. Technology is treated as a public good. 
By contrast, there is a large heterodox body of literature which argues that regi-
onal economic differences are not nec.essarily narrowed by factor mobility and 
trade; and now neoclassical growth theory is challenged by «new>>, endogenous 
growth theory which predicts divergence, or only conditional convergence, by 
relaxing the (always dubious) assumption of diminishing returns to capital, so 
that the ratio of saving or investment to GOP also matters for long run growth. 
Where does the truth lie? What story should we tell our grandchildren? More 
importantly, what model should policy makers think in terms of when entering 
into Customs Unions, or common currency areas with other countries, which 
allow for the greater freedom of trade and the free mobility of factors of 
production? What story one believes has implications for the predictions of what 
is likely to happen to «regional>> differences within the European Union (EU) 
with the implementation of full economic and monetary union (EMU) from 15 ' 
January 1999. 
I will argue that whether a region or country gains relative to others with 
the general freeing of factor mobility and trade depends first on the nature and 
strength of factor movements; second, on the structure of production and the 
demand characteristics of goods, and thirdly on the balance of payments (or 
monetary) consequences of the freeing of trade. 
First of all, however, let us rehearse the neoclassical story. Take two regions 
(A and B) both at the same level of development, and then assume that one 
region (say A) suffers an adverse shock which raises unemployment and reduces 
wages. Labour migrates from A to B in response to differences in opportunities 
(") This paper is based on a lecture given at the Technical University of Lisbon, 15th Ja-
nu~ry 1999. 
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which is supposed to lower unemployment and raise wages in A, and to raise 
unemployment and lower wages in 8, leading to equality. Capital, by contrast, 
is assumed to «migrate» from 8 to A in response to a higher rate of return on 
capital where wages are lower, thus reinforcing the equilibrating tendency. It is 
immediately obvious that all this is very general and static, and a number of 
qualifications need to be made. First, migration is usually a very selective process 
which can have serious detrimental effects in the region of origin and confer 
positive externalities in the regions of destination (see Fagerberg, Verspagen and 
Caniels, 1992). Secondly, migration not only affects supply, it also affects demand. 
When labour moves into a region it demands goods and services which adds 
to labour demand, and when labour leaves a region the demand for output falls. 
The supply and demand for labour are interdependent. Thirdly, and a related 
point, the (expected) rate of return on capital is affected by demand as well as 
by the cost of labour. Capital is just as likely to flow to high wage regions to 
which labour is migrating as to low wage regions where investment opportunities 
(at least for the provision of local goods and services) are diminishing. In short, 
factor movements may not be equalising, as Myrdal (1957) and Hirschman (1957) 
tried to teach us a long time ago. On the contrary, they may be disequilibrating 
through a process which Myrdal first coined «circular and cumulative causation>>, 
which_ is nothing more than the idea of virtuous and vicious circles based on 
positive and negative feedback mechanisms (1). The proposition applies to both 
regions within countries and between countries, although there are likely to be 
differences in the strength of migration and the characteristics of migration in 
the two sets of economies. 
In the static neoclassical equilibrium model, trade is also equilibrating. In 
the absence of factor mobility, trade acts as a substitute, with poor, low wage 
regions specialising in relatively labour intensive goods, and rich, high wage 
regions specialising in relatively capital intensive goods. The returns to factors 
of production will equalise. All this assumes that labour productivity is the same 
across regions, and that free trade does not disturb the assumption of full 
employment. Two major factors could cause unemployment: firstly, a limit to 
employment in diminishing returns activities, and secondly balance of payments 
constraints on demand if the balance of payments consequences of trade are 
not self-rectifying. 
Another· strand of the neoclassical story which emphasises equilibrium and 
convergence is neoclassical growth theory, which has recently been challenged 
by «new», endogenous growth theory, but had already been challenged by 
economists in the past, most notably by Kaldor (1957, 1961) in his various growth 
models which introduced a technical progress function to replace the neoclassical 
(1) Hirschman used the term «polarisation effects». 
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production function and dropped the assumption of diminishing returns to capi-
tal. There are three basic predictions of the conventional (Solow, 1956) 
neoclassical growth model: 
a) First, the steady state level of per capita income depends positively 
on the savings/investment ratio, and negatively on the rate of 
population growth; 
b) Secondly, in the steady state, the long run growth of output is 
determined by the rate of growth of the labour force in efficiency 
units (i. e. the rate of growth of the physical labour force plus the 
rate of labour augmenting technical progress) and is independent of 
the savings-investment ratio because a higher level of saving and 
investment is offset by a higher capital-output ratio (or a lower 
productivity of capital) owing to the assumption of diminishing returns 
to capital; and 
c) Thirdly, that given the same tastes and technology across regions, 
and the assumed inverse relation between the level of capital per 
head and the productivity of capital, poor regions will grow faster 
than rich regions, thus leading to the convergence of per capita 
income across regions (unconditional convergence as it is called in 
the «new» growth literature). 
We see from this brief introduction that orthodox neoclassical theory is 
obsessed with the notions of equilibrium and convergence; with the presumption 
that free trade and the free mobility of the factors of production will always benefit 
poor regions and countries relative to richer regions and countries, and regional 
economic disparities will narrow. Three issues then arise. First, how does the 
neoclassical story stand up to empirical scrutiny? Secondly, if it doesn't, what 
are the forces that may perpetuate divergence? Thirdly, what will be the likely 
regional consequences of EMU? The remainder of the paper addresses these 
three issues. 
Convergence or divergence across countries and regions? 
Countries 
First of all, if we think of regions as countries, what does the international 
evidence suggest? Neoclassical growth theory predicts unconditional convergence, 
but it was clear long before the advent of «new» growth theory that there had 
been no narrowing of the international distribution of income, at least in the post-
war years. The growth of income per head has been as high (if not higher) in 
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rich countries as in poor countries, leaving the Gini ratio for the world distribution 
of income virtually unchanged. The assumptions of neoclassical growth theory, 
however, were always so unrealistic that there could never be the presumption 
of unconditional convergence. It is simply not true that preferences and technology 
are the same across countries, giving the same ratios of saving and investment 
to GOP and the same production function. On the latter point, it was always 
foolish to assume, as Kaldor pointed out in several different contexts, that the 
productivity of capital would be lower in capital-rich countries than in capital-
poor countries, therefore giving a lower rate of growth in rich countries for the 
same ratio of output invested. Outside of the neoclassical paradigm, the amount 
of investment always mattered for long run growth long before the invention of 
endogenous growth theory. Two quotes from Kaldor will illustrate: 
and: 
As regards the process of economic change and development in 
capitalist societies, I suggest the following <<stylised facts» as a starting 
point for the construction of theoretical models [ ... ](4) steady capital-
output ratios over long periods; at least there are no clear long-term 
trends, either rising or falling if differences in the degree of capital 
utilisation are allowed for. This implies, or reflects, the near identity in 
the percentage rate of growth of production and of the capital stock -
i. e. that for the economy as a whole, and over long periods, income 
and capital tend to grow at the same rate [Kaldor, 1961]. 
A lower capital-labour ratio does not necessarily imply a lower 
capital-output ratio - indeed, the reverse is often the case. The 
countries with the most highly mechanised industries, such as the 
United States, do not require a higher ratio of capital to output. The 
capital-output ratio in the United States has been falling over the past 
50 years whilst the capital-labour ratio has been steadily rising; and it 
is lower in the United States today than in the manufacturing industries 
of many underdeveloped countries [emphasis added]. Technological 
progress in the present century led to a vast increase in the productivity 
of labour, but this was not accompanied by any associated reduction 
in the productivity of capital investment [Kaldor, 1972]. 
Kaldor is the true progenitor of «new» endogenous growth theory (see, also, 
Palley, 1996). Given that the capital-output ratio (K/0) may be expressed as the 
ratio of the capital-labour ratio (K/L) and the productivity of labour (0/L), anything 
which increases the productivity of labour in the same proportion as the capital-
labour ratio as countries get richer will keep the productivity of capital unchanged. 
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<<New», endogenous growth theory has chosen to concentrate on externalities 
to R&D expenditure (Romer, 1986) and education (Lucas, 1988), but there are 
several other mechanisms that will raise labour productivity in the course of 
growth and capital deepening, including learning by doing, embodied technical 
progress, micro and macro increasing returns - all mechanisms that have been 
discussed in the growth and development literature for centuries, going back at 
least to Adam Smith in 1776 [see also, Young (1928) and Verdoorn (1949)]. 
In the tradition of «new>> growth theory, the test of the neoclassical growth 
model and unconditional convergence is to take a cross section of countries 
and to regress the growth of per capita incomes over a given period on the 
initial level of per capita income. A negative sign indicates poor countries growing 
faster than rich countries [or beta (~) convergence] (2). Taking large samples of 
rich and poor countries shows no evidence of ~ convergence, although there is 
some evidence of (unconditional) convergence clubs for certain (homogenous) 
groups of countries over certain time periods. One of the first studies in this 
field was by Barra (1991) who took 98 countries over the period 1960 to 1985. 
There is no significant negative relation between the growth of per capita income 
and the initial level of per capita income, but the model is then augmented to 
allow for differences in human capital formation proxied by school enrollment 
rates. With this additional variable in the equation, the sign on the initial per 
capita income variable turns significantly negative. For Barra, this rehabilitates 
the neoclassical model i. e. there would be convergence if only countries had 
the same level of human capital formation (3). It should be pointed out at this 
stage, however, (because the interpretation of other studies is also affected) that 
a negative sign on the per capita income variable indicating conditional 
convergence is not necessarily support for the neoclassical assumption of 
diminishing returns to capital. The negative sign could be picking up the effects 
of <<catch-up>>, or the effect of resource shifts from low productivity agriculture to 
higher productivity industry in poor countries, and both phenomena are 
conceptually distinct from the shape of the production function (4). Further large 
sample studies by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992); Knight, Loayza and 
Villanueva (1993), and Barra and Wha-Lee (1993) also show no evidence of 
unconditional convergence, but evidence of conditional convergence when other 
factors affecting the growth of output per head are allowed for such as political 
(2) It should be noted that beta convergence does not necessarily imply a narrowing of the 
dispersion of per capita incomes because dispersion can be affected by the behaviour of outlying 
observations (i. e. beta convergence does not imply sigma convergence). 
(3) It should mentioned that the Sarro study excludes key variables such as the investment 
ratio and population growth which might have altered thes results. 
(4) I have to say on this in Thirlwall and Sanna (1996). 
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instability; government activity; market distortions, and trade variables (for a survey 
of evidence, see Thirlwall and Sanna, 1996). Levine and Renelt (1992) and 
Levine and Zervos (1993) show, however, that in all these cross section equations 
estimated, only four variables are really robust in the sense that their significance 
is not affected when other variables are added to the equations; they are: initial 
per capita income, the investment ratio, education and population growth. All 
other variables are «fragile». The most recent study I have seen which illustrates 
well the points made above is shown in table 1 below. 
TABLE 1 
Explaining growth of per capita GOP, 1960-88 
Unconditional Conditional The richer accumulate faster 
divergence divergence 
- -
Average growth Average growth Investment Primary school 
of GOP per of GOP per level enrollment 
capita capita 
Effect of: 
Initial level of GDP per capita relative 
to leader ........................................ 0.40 - 0.32 4.43 4.57 
Average level of investment.. ........... - 0.07 - -
Average enrollment in primary school - 0.03 - -
Source: Lant Prichett, «Divergence, Big Time», unpublished, World Bank, 1995. 
The study takes 117 countries over the period 1960-88. Column 1 shows 
no evidence of unconditional convergence because the coefficient of 0.40 is 
positive. Column 2 shows the coefficient turns negative once differences in the 
level of investment and schooling are allowed for. Columns 3 and 4 show how 
investment and schooling are positively correlated with the level of per capita 
income. 
Regions 
Now let us consider the evidence across regions within countries (including 
the European Union as a single economy). There are examples where free trade 
and factor mobility do seem to be associated with a narrowing of regional 
differences in economic welfare. The most spectacular case seems to be the 
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United States where Sarro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) show that there has been a 
process of regional per capita income convergence going on over the last 
hundred years. Taking personal income data, they find an inverse relation across 
US regions between the average growth of per capita income over the period 
1880-1988 and the initial (1880) level of per capital income, with a correlation 
coefficient of - 0.93. Only two sub-periods, 1920-30 and 1980-88, show evidence 
of divergence. Using Gross State Product over the period 1963-86 shows a 
similar inverse relation across 48 States, although the correlation coefficient is 
smaller and there is more instability between the various sub-periods. This 
disappears, however, when the sectoral composition of State output is allowed 
for. Both income and product data suggest convergence at the rate of 
approximately 2 percent per annum. 
In Europe, the evidence is more mixed. Across the regions of Europe, there 
is evidence of per capita income convergence over the long period 1950 to 1990, 
but the process may have stopped in the 1980s. On the other hand, regional 
productivity levels continued to converge in the 1980s, but at the expense of 
unemployment. Regional unemployment rate differences both within Europe as 
a whole, and within individual countries, have remained remarkably stubborn over 
a long period. Sarro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) take 73 EU regions over the period 
1950-85, and find convergence of regional per capita incomes at the rate of 
2 percent per annum. The study has been criticised by Armstrong (1995a), 
however, on the grounds that the GOP data are expressed in current prices 
and exchange rates, and only regions in the seven most prosperous EU countries 
are considered (5). Armstrong expands the data set to include seven Spanish 
regions, three Greek regions and the countries of Ireland, Portugal and 
Luxembourg as separate «regions», and converts the GOP statistics into constant 
(1985) prices and exchange rates. Also extending the time period to 1990, he 
finds the rate of convergence to be considerably slower than 2 percent per 
annum, and virtually non-existent in the 1980s. Convergence is confirmed, 
although proceeding at different rates, taking the coefficient of variation of GOP 
per capita across 85 regions of the EU for selected years (Armstrong 1995b) -
see table 2. This is a measure of what is called sigma-convergence (cr), and 13 
convergence is a necessary (although not a sufficient) condition for cr 
convergence. The data shows substantial narrowing of per capita incomes 
between 1950 and 1970; slower convergence between 1970 and 1990, and not 
much change at all between 1975 and 1992 measured by gross value added at 
market prices. 
(5) Armstrong also points out that the 73 regions do not -coincide with any of the standard 
definitions of regions used by Eurostat - but, of course, any definition of a «region» is arbitrary. 
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TABLE 2 
Coefficients of variation of GOP per capita: 85 EU Regions 1950-1992 
a) Gross Value Added at factor cost: 
1950 ...................................................................................................... . 
1960 ...................................................................................................... . 
1970 ...................................................................................................... . 
b) Gross domestic product at market prices: 
1970 ...................................................................................................... . 
1980 ..................................................................................................... .. 
1990 ..................................................................................................... .. 
c) Gross value added at market prices: 
1975 ...................................................................................................... . 
1980 ...................................................................................................... . 
1985 ...................................................................................................... . 
1990 ...................................................................................................... . 
1992 ...................................................................................................... . 
Source: Armstrong (1995b). 












Paci (1997) takes per capita income and labour productivity across 109 
regions in 12 EU countries over the period 1980-1990, also distinguishing 
between the three sectors of agriculture, industry and services. He finds no 
evidence for p or cr convergence of per capita income, but strong evidence for 
b and s convergence of productivity levels. Sigma convergence is shown in fi-
gure 1. The difference in results is accounted for by differences in the rate of 
unemployment and participation rates between regions which affects the level 
of per capita income, but not productivity. Part of the convergence in productivity 
is the result of the shift from agricultural to industrial and service activities, 
because in the former there is no evidence of convergence while in the latter 
two sectors there is. 
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FIGURE 1 
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Fagerberg and Verspagen (1996) reach similar conclusions regarding per 
capita income, at least for the 1980s. They take 70 regions in six EU countries 
and show convergence up to 1980, but not thereafter. For the period 1957-70, 
the rate of catch-up is estimated at 4.3 percent per annum; for the period 1970-90, 
2.4 percent per annum, but for the period 1980-90 there was no significant catch-
up. The authors argue that the scope for convergence is not exhausted, but 
other factors pushed towards divergence, particularly differences in unemployment 
and in research and development (R&D) effort between industrial and agricultural 
regions. Indeed, it appears to be the case from a further study by Fagerberg, 
Verspagen and Caniels (1996) that regional differences in per capita income 
are systematically related to differences in unemployment rates. They take 64 
regions in Germany, France, Italy and Spain over the period 1980-90, and find 
that growth in poor regions is hampered by unfavourable industrial structure and 
weak R&D effort. Employment in poor regions grew faster, but so did labour 
supply, preventing a reduction in the rate of unemployment. There is evidence 
of conditional convergence, but only after allowing for differences in industrial 
structure, R&D effort, population density and migration. Interestingly, labour 
migration is found to have a strong positive impact on per capita income growth, 
indicating that migration was disequilibrating during this period. The policy 
implications are that the predominance of agriculture is a barrier to growth in 
poor regions, mainly because the scope for scale economies and R&D is less 
than in industry. Faster growth requires structural change in favour of industrial 
activities, but this requires, in turn, the appropriate physical infrastructure and the 
provision of human capital- the factors now stressed by «new» growth theory. 
Turning to regional unemployment rates across Europe, the pattern is shown 
in figure 2. 
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FIGURE 2 
Regional unemployment across the European Union, 1994 
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There is no evidence of «global» convergence over the last twenty years. 
A study by Baddeley, Martin and Tyler (1996) shows that the absolute dispersion 
of ratios tends to follow a pro-cyclical pattern, rising in the recession of the early 
1980s, falling in the boom 1986-90, and rising again post-1990 (6). Underlying 
these cyclical movements, the trend of dispersion has been upwards. The degree 
of dispersion for different levels of regional disaggregation is shown in figure 3. 
Taking 427 regions in the UK, Germany, France, Spain, Belgium and Italy, the 
standard deviation of unemployment rates rose from 3.2 in 1983 to 4.5 in 1994. 
Within the six countries themselves, regional unemployment rate differences have 
either persisted or widened, except in the UK. The authors argue that the 
persistence should not be interpreted as a prolonged disequilibrium in regional 
labour markets, but as an equilibrium phenomenon associated with differences 
in industrial structure and the numbers of long term unemployed. 
(6 ) In an early study of the cyclical sensitivity of unemployment, I found this behaviour for 
the regions of the UK (Thirlwall, 1966). 
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FIGURE 3 
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I shall argue below that differences in regional growth rates should also be 
interpreted as an equilibrium phenomenon associated with differences in indus-
trial composition and in the income elasticity of demand for regional exports and 
imports. 
Growth inequality 
Let us now address the question in more depth of what are the major factors 
that account for the growth inequalities between regions and countries which 
may prevent the convergence of per capita income and unemployment. Some 
have been mentioned already such as investment, education and R&D 
expenditure, but many of these factors are themselves endogenous. I suggest 
here a rather different perspective. One of the significant facts to remember in 
discussing regions within countries is that they are very open economies, in many 
cases exporting and importing 90 percent or more of their regional product. If 
this is the case, it is impossible to understand the growth performance of regions 
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without reference to the strength of the external demand for their products. When 
factors of production are freely mobile, growth can never be supply constrained 
in the neoclassical sense (except for land based activities). Countries are also 
becoming increasingly open, and one of the major criticisms of «new» growth 
theory is that with a few exceptions most of the modelling is done as if economies 
are closed. There is no recognition of the importance of external demand in 
driving the growth process, or constraints on demand imposed, for example, by 
the balance of payments. Where trade is modelled, the measure of trade is the 
share of exports and/or imports in GOP. This may pick up the static gains from 
trade, and technological spillovers from trading contacts, but not the dynamic 
gains from trade or the growth effects of trade that come from the expansion of 
demand, or from the supply side through the greater ability to import (7). 
It is a fundamental proposition in Keynesian growth economics (Hicks, 1950, 
Kaldor, 1970} that the rate of growth of output is determined by the dominant 
component of autonomous demand, to which other components of demand will 
adapt. In an open economy, the major component of autonomous demand is 
likely to be export demand. Below, I develop a model of export-led growth which 
has some interesting properties and can be used to explain growth rate 
differences between regions or countries either as a cumulative disequilibrium 
process or as a persistent equilibrium process associated with the demand 
characteristics of the goods exported and imported. 
Let (1) 
where y is the growth of output, x is the growth of exports and t is a time 
subscript. y is the constant elasticity of output growth with respect to export 
growth. 
Now assume a constant elasticity export demand function which makes 
exports a function of relative prices (competitiveness) and income outside the 
«region», so that: 
(2) 
where (Pdt- Ptt) is the difference in the rate of growth of domestic and foreign 
prices (measured in a common currency); z1 is the growth of income outside 
the «region»; 11 (< 0) is the price elasticity of demand for exports, and £(> 0} is 
the income elasticity of demand for exports. 
(l) When export growth is included as an independent variable in a «macro-determinants of 
growth» equation of the Barro-type, it is highly significant (see Thirlwall and Sanna 1996). 
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Assume that export prices are determined by a percentage mark-up on unit 
labour costs, so that the growth of domestic prices is given by: 
(3) 
where w1 is the rate of growth of wages; r1 is the rate of growth of labour 
productivity, and t1 is the growth of 1 + % markup. 
Finally, let the rate of growth of labour productivity be partly induced by 
the growth of output itself (Verdoorn's Law) owing to the existence of static and 




is autonomous productivity growth, and A is the Verdoorn coefficient. 
Combining equations (1) to (4) gives an expression for the equilibrium growth 
rate of: 
111l(w1- ra + r1- p11) + ez1] 
Yt = 1 + YTlA (5) 
Remembering that 11 < 0, the growth rate is shown to vary positively with 
r
8
, z, £, p, and A, and negatively with w and 't. The model is circular since fast 
export growth leads to fast output growth; fast output growth leads to. fast 
productivity growth; fast productivity growth leads to improved competitiveness, 
and a faster rate of growth of exports. The interesting question then naturally 
arises, if the equilibrium is disturbed does the growth rate cumulatively diverge 
or return to equilibrium? This has a bearing on how regional differences in growth 
rates should be interpreted, and the precise meaning of Myrdal's model of «Cir-
cular and cumulative causation». 
In a two region (or country) model, a necessary condition for the divergence 
of growth rates is that the growth rate of one of the regions diverges from its 
own equilibrium rate. Whether divergence will take place is essentially an 
empirical issue depending on the stability conditions of the model in disequilibrium. 
If for simplicity we confine ourselves to a first-order system, it is clear from the 
circular nature of the model that a one period lag in any of the equations gives 
the same stability conditions, namely that convergence to, or divergence from, 
the equilibrium growth rate depends on whether )'llA 1 . If we assume a one period 
lag in the export demand function, we get the first order difference equation: 
the general solution to which is: 
111l(w,_1 - ra + 1 1-1 - Ptt-1) + E(z,_1)] 
y: = A(- )'11A)1 + -----------
t 1 + YllA 
where A is the initial condition. 
(7) 
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The behaviour of y depends on the value of Yll"-· Since y > O,A. > 0 and 
11 < 0,(- YllA.) > 0. The condition for cumulative divergence from equilibrium is 
that (- Yll"-) > 1. This is possible but unlikely since 0 < y < 1 if exports grow 
faster than output; A. (the Verdoorn coefficient) rarely exceeds 0.5, and the price 
elasticity of demand for exports (11) rarely exceeds 2. In short, observed growth 
rate differences are likely to reflect differences in equilibrium growth rates rather 
than a process of divergence (we don't observe the <<World» exploding!). 
Differences in equilibrium growth rates, in turn, are likely to reflect structural 
differences between economies captured in differences in the income elasticities 
of demand for exports (E). There are big differences in the income elasticities of 
demand of different types of commodities: between primary products and indus-
trial goods, and between different types of industrial goods. The opening up of 
trade which forces countries into different patterns. of specialisation may produce 
large disparities in equilibrium growth rates associated with the demand 
characteristics of goods. 
Balance of payments constrained growth 
The export-led, <<cumulative-causation» growth model outlined above lacks 
a balance of payments constraint. The equilibrium growth of output given by 
equation (5) or (7) could give a rate of growth of imports which exceeds the 
growth of exports, leading to an unsustainable balance of payments position. In 
the long run, no country or region can grow faster than that rate consistent with 
balance of payments equilibrium on current account unless it can finance ever-
growing deficits which, in general, it cannot. For most countries, the maximum 
long run sustainable deficit to GOP ratio seems to be of the order of 1-2 percent. 
Through the largesse of governments, regions within countries can probably 
sustain larger deficits, but the general proposition remains that regional problems 
are balance of payments problems (Thirlwall, 1980}. 
It is easy to impose a balance of payments constraint into the model and 
to derive the sustainable growth rate consistent with payments equilibrium. Let 
the initial balance of payments equilibrium be defined as: 
PrJ<= P,ME (8) 
where Pd is export prices; X is the volume of exports; P, is import prices in 
foreign currency; M is the volume of imports, and E is the exchange rate 
measured as the domestic price of foreign currency (which converts the value 
of imports in foreign currency into domestic currency). 
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The condition for a moving equilibrium through time is: 
Pd + x = Pt + m + e (9) 
where lower case letters represent rates of growth of the variables. 
The growth of exports containing the idea of a virtuous circle [combining 
equations (2), (3) and (4)] gives: 
(10) 
The growth of imports may be written as: 
m = 'Jf (p, - pd + e) + n(y) (11) 
where 'Jf (< 0) is the price elasticity of demand for imports, and 1t (> 0) is the 
income elasticity of demand for imports. Substituting (1 0) and (11) into (9), and 
solving for the growth of income consistent with balance of payments equilibrium 
(y.g) gives: 
(1 + TJ + ljf) [w - r. + -r - p1 - e] + E(z) 
Ya = 
1t + A.(1 + TJ + ljf) 
(12) 
If we were to assume either that relative prices measured in a common 
currency do not change very much and there is no Verdoorn effect, or that the 
Marshaii-Lerner condition is just satisfied so that TJ + 'JI = - 1, then equation 





E ---z 1t 
(13) 
(14) 
i. e. a region's or country's long run growth rate can be approximated by the ratio 
of the income elasticities of demand for exports to the income elasticity of demand 
for imports. This is now known in the literature as the dynamic Harrod trade multiplier 
result (where cz= x) (8). Equation (14) is the basis of the classic centre-periphery 
models of Prebisch (1950) and Seers (1962) where growth rate differences between 
regions are dependent on the income elasticities of demand for exports and imports 
reflecting the structural characteristics of regions in production and trade. 
(B) See McCombie and Thirlwall (1994, 1997). For a recent survey, see also the mini-
Symposium on Thirlwall's Law in Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Spring 1997. 
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What will happen to regional differences with EMU? 
One interesting finding in the work on regional growth performance is that 
when national dummy variables are included in the regional growth equations 
(Armstrong, 1995b; Paci, 1997), the explanatory power of the equations increases 
dramatically and the estimated rate of (regional) convergence (or catch-up) falls 
considerably. This suggests that movements in convergence/divergence have 
much more to do with what is happening to growth performance between 
countries than to what is happening to regional performance within countries. 
A second point to note is that testing for ~ convergence and finding that 
the test is significant is not a confirmation that the growth process is necessarily 
described by a neoclassical model with diminishing returns to capital. The growth 
process may be more accurately described by a cumulative causation model 
based on increasing returns, as outlined above, and yet nonetheless convegence 
be observed because of other countervailing forces. As suggested earlier, 
convergence may be the result of «catch-up», or faster structural change in poor 
countries or regions. Also, convergence could be the result of the implementation 
of regional policies. Most EU countries have pursued active regional policies for 
at least the last three decades, and the EU itself pursues regional and structural 
policies to promote growth in deprived regions .. 
In considering, therefore, what is likely to happen to regional disparities with 
the implementation of monetary union, the basic questions to consider are firstly 
is there likely to be real convergence between the countries of Europe that form 
the single currency area, and secondly will regional (and structural) policies be 
strong enough to offset divergent tendencies if countries adversely affected by 
shocks find difficulty in adjusting because they have lost sovereignty over 
monetary and exchange rate policy? 
This raises the question, in turn, of whether the countries that have decided 
to adopt a single currency constitute an optimum currency area. In other words, 
do they comprise a sufficiently homogenous economic entity in which it is sensible 
to have just one currency instead of multiple currencies, and to operate a single 
economic policy as opposed to countries operating their own independent 
economic policies? This clearly depends on the benefits and costs of a single 
currency, and whether the benefits outweigh the costs, where the benefits and 
costs are measured in terms of output gains and losses within the area as a 
whole. The costs of a single currency relate to: the loss of the exchange rate 
as an instrument of policy to maintain a country's competitiveness; the loss of 
the interest rate as an instrument of economic policy, and loss of fiscal discretion. 
These are all powerful weapons of economic policy that countries entering a 
single currency area surrender; weapons that are traditionally used for managing 
economies to prevent recession and to control inflation. This is a considerable 
loss of sovereignty. The benefits of a single currency relate largely to the 
promotion of trade and the greater mobility of factors of production - labour 
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and capital- leading to a more efficient allocation of resources. The question 
then is: under what economic circumstances are the costs likely to be minimised 
and the benefits maximised, so that one can be sure that the currency area is 
an optimum? Four conditions are normally specified. 
The first condition to minimise costs is that economies should be roughly 
similar and synchronised so that shocks are symmetrical in the sense that if a 
shock to the system takes place (e. g. a world recession or an oil price increase 
etc.), all the countries are affected in the same way so that countries do not 
require specific individual policies applied to them. This, of course, is the reason 
why so much attention in the run-up to monetary union focussed on countries 
reaching certain convergence criteria. Note, however, that all the convergence 
criteria were monetary in nature, relating to inflation, interest rates, budget deficits 
and the size of the national debt. But monetary convergence is no guarantee of 
real convergence, nor any guarantee that future shocks will be symmetrical. The 
more countries and regions are specialised, the less symmetrical shocks are 
likely to be. Indeed, given the diverse nature of the economies of the EU, and 
differences in institutional arrangements, it is likely that any future shocks will 
be asymmetrical. Real convergence will require monetary divergence which will 
be precluded by the single currency. 
If costs are incurred in particular countries or regions, in terms of lost output 
and unemployment, a second condition to minimise costs in an optimum currency 
area is that there should be sufficient labour market flexibility and capital mobility 
to mitigate the costs. The presumption is that if wages are sufficiently flexible, 
and labour and capital are freely mobile, the underutilisation of resources in 
depressed regions can be eliminated. There are two responses to this argument. 
Firstly, wages may not be flexible downwards, and even if they were Keynesian 
theory teaches that wage flexibility may not be an efficient adjustment mechanism 
in the case of demand shocks. Abraham and Van Rompuy (1995) have tested 
for regional wage flexibility in Europe by regressing wage growth against the 
growth of regional unemployment, national unemployment, productivity growth 
and other variables using combined time series and regional cross section data 
(334 observations) and cast doubt on the role of wage flexibility in regional labour 
markets. Changes in national variables seem to have a stronger impact than 
regional conditions on regional wages. Secondly, labour and capital mobility may 
not be equilibrating, as argued earlier. There is no guarantee that capital will 
move to depressed regions to take advantage of surplus labour, and there is no 
guarantee that net emigration will necessarily alleviate the unemployment problem 
of depressed regions if it sets up cumulative forces which further depress the 
region. Even if neoclassical adjustment mechanisms are allowed to work, they 
may turn out to work perversely. 
A third condition to minimise costs is that fiscal transfer mechanisms exist 
which automatically come into operation if countries within the single currency 
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area become depressed and unemployment rises -as, for example, in an indi-
vidual country where government expenditure on unemployment and social 
security automatically rises as unemployment rises which cushions consumption 
in a region. At present, these mechanisms between the countries of EMU simply 
do not exist. 
Finally, a fourth condition for an optimum currency area is that multiple 
currencies are seriouslyimpeding trade and the efficient allocation of resources. 
Under these circumstances, moving to a single currency would maximise benefits. 
No one disputes that trade is an important engine of growth, and of mutual benefit 
to countries, provided it leads to the balanced growth of exports and imports, 
but I think the argument here is exaggerated for two reasons. Firstly, there is 
no firm empirical evidence that multiple currencies and fluctuating exchange rates 
discourage trade. But this is not surprising, since big traders hedge against 
currency fluctuations. Secondly, trade has grown and flourished in Europe for 
the last fifty years with multiple currencies (and would continue to do so without 
a single currency). Indeed, now that barriers to trade have virtually been 
eliminated, the major determinant of trade is the buoyancy of markets. There is 
a real danger that trade may be discouraged by the single currency if the euro-
area becomes a deflationary zone because the European Central Bank (ECB) 
sets interest rates to achieve monetary stability at the expense of growth, and 
to keep the euro strong in relation to the US dollar. In the last decade, the EU 
has been one of the most deflationary regions of the world economy in the 
attempt by countries to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria. 
All that can really be said with any certainty on the benefit side is that 
there will be a saving in transaction costs, estimated at about $30 billion a year. 
This is a big saving absolutely, but very small in relation to the combined GDP 
of EU countries, and set against the potential costs of monetary union. The 
potential costs of the single currency are enormous relating to the loss of 
sovereignty over monetary policy, fiscal policy and the exchange rate. 
On monetary policy, it cannot make economic sense to have one interest 
rate for all countries regardless of individual country circumstances. Firstly, there 
is no reason to suppose that the economic cycles of countries will be sufficiently 
synchronised that all countries require the same interest rate at the same time 
in order to regulate the level of economic activity. Secondly, the impact of interest 
rate changes on_ economic activity will differ between countries according to 
differences in the sensitivity of investment and consumption, and particularly in 
the demand for housing. The interest rate decided by the ECB will be some 
·compromise rate which suits no one country in particular, designed to target a 
European-wide inflation rate (and when the trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment also differs between countries). This is going to pose serious 
problems of economic management for countries. Booms will be more difficult 
to control, and depressed economies will be unable to reduce interest rates to 
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stimulate activity. The latter poses an even greater problem because members 
of the single currency are bound by fiscal rules and cannot easily boost public 
expenditure and reduce taxes. 
On fiscal policy, a Stability Pact was agreed at the Dublin Summit in 1996 
that countries should not run deficits of more than 3 percent of GOP without 
incurring a fine of 0.2 percent of GOP and another 0.1 percent of GOP for every 
one percentage point of deficit over the 3 percent limit. In conditions of 
depression, this makes no economic sense. If the deficit itself results from a 
recessionary shock, the Stability Pact will compound the deflation, and the fine 
in such circumstances would make the deficit even worse. At the very least, 
cyclical deficits need to be separated from structural deficits, as the OECD already 
does for countries. 
On exchange rate policy, the exchange rate as an instrument of economic 
policy for members of the single currency completely disappeared on 1st January 
1999 when exchange rates became irrevocably locked prior to the abandonment 
of national currencies in 2002. It is sometimes naively said that if exchange rates 
disappear, the balance of payments problems of countries also disappear because 
there is no longer an exchange rate to defend. Whoever heard of Scotland, Sicily 
or the regions of Portugal having a balance of payments problem? Exchange 
rates disappearing, however, do not mean that imbalances between exports and 
imports disappear. What it means is that when plans to import exceed plans to 
export, the exchange rate is no longer there to take the strain, and balance of 
payments problems will manifest themselves, not in the form of a depreciating 
currency which encourages exports and discourages imports, but as falling output 
and higher unemployment. Regional problems of slow growth and high 
unemployment within countries are essentially balance of payments problems 
which, by definition, cannot be alleviated by exchange rate movements because 
regions within a country are already part of a single currency area (Thirlwall, 
1980). Likewise, a single European currency will de facto turn the countries of 
Europe into regions as defenceless as regions within countries; with the added 
disadvantage, however, that the Europe-wide budget to cope with pockets of 
deprivation and unemployment is far smaller in relation to the size of the areas 
likely to be affected than the size of national budgets in relation to the regional 
problems of countries. There is no built-in mechanism for the automatic transfer 
and redistribution of resources between countries, as there is, for example, 
between States in the USA. I would concede that the exchange rate is of limited 
use in permanently raising the growth rate of a country, unless it can engineer 
a continuing depreciation in the real exchange rate, but it remains an invaluable 
weapon to combat internal and external shocks, or gradually deteriorating 
competitiveness. Who knows where the shocks to countries will come from in 
the future, and how they will affect countries differently, as they surely will? The 
consequences of a single currency in the face of a deterioration in 
competitiveness could be serious damage to the real economy, which means a 
loss of output and jobs. 
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Conclusion 
The great challenge in Europe at this present time is to boost growth and 
to create jobs. I see nothing in the single currency itself that is going to produce 
a more dynamic European economy. In fact, by the «rules of the game», the 
introduction of the euro could be deflationary for at least three reasons. Firstly, · 
the task of the independent ECB is quite clear and that is to control inflation. 
Interest rates wHI :not be set to promote growth and to reduce unemployment 
but to keep a lid on the price level, despite the fact that there is no scientific 
evidence -from time series or cross section data that suggests that price stability 
is a precondition for faster growth. On the contrary, inflation and growth appear 
to be positively correlated within the range 0-8 percent inflation (9). Secondly, 
the ECB will want to promote a strong euro to compete with the US dollar. It 
certainly has the potential to do so with the euro area accounting for a slightly 
higher share of world trade than the US and with a larger volume of foreign 
exchange reserves. The ECB will need to keep interest rates relatively high to 
keep the euro strong. Thirdly, there is nothing in the pacts and conditions 
governing monetary union that provide safeguards against deflation, such as 
governments running budgetary surpluses or other policies which lead to falling 
prices or rising unemployment. The rules of the game are asymmetric, biased 
against inflation, as indeed they are at the international level whereby the IMF 
penalises countries in balance of payments deficit but not those in surplus, which 
therefore imparts deflationary bias in the world economy. At the European level, 
the Stability Pact will lead to deflationary bias, and the loss of the exchange 
rate to combat a loss of competitiveness will work in the same direction. 
From what I have said, it should be clear that I do not believe that monetary 
union will lead to the real convergence of member countries. If anything, 
increased divergence is more likely. This being so, greater regional divergence 
is also likely given that regional disparities are more closely related to regional 
disparities between countries than to regional disparities within countries. All this, 
of course, is quite independent of the accession of new states to the EU which 
is another story. 
(9) For an up-to-date survey, see Thirlwall (19.99). 
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